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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the Supreme Court has become the most active and
chief protector of the rights of indigents who have been accused or con-
victed of crimes. Much of the force of this activity has focused upon
the rights of accused indigents to have counsel appointed to assist them
at criminal trials1 or in the prosecution of subsequent appeals.2 However,
no opinion has been rendered dealing with the subject matter of this com-
ment-the right of an indigent to have counsel appointed to aid him in
asserting a post-conviction remedy' collaterally attacking a prior criminal
conviction, after the appellate process has been exhausted.4 Although
the Supreme Court has been silent in this regard, its vigor in dealing with
related right to counsel problems5 and other aspects of post-conviction
relief' indicates that it may simply be a question of time before an opinion
is handed down.
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (States have an absolute duty to appoint
counsel to represent indigents at criminal trials.).
2. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (States have an absolute duty to appoint
counsel to represent indigents at the first and only criminal appeal granted as a matter of
right.).
3. E.g., habeas corpus, coram nobis, and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
4. Collaterally attacking a prior criminal conviction is just one of the myriad of func-
tions of post-conviction remedies. Right to counsel at these other functions is beyond the
scope of this paper. See generally Kadisk, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the
Pero-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803 (1961); McKesson, Right to Counsel in
Juvenile Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REV. 843 (1961).
5. See notes 1 and 2 supra.
6. E.g., in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) the court held that even the unexcused
failure of a state prisoner to make timely use of state and post-conviction remedies does
not bar relief under the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958); and in
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), Warren Ch. J. writing for the court held, inter alia,
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Until then, perhaps the best way to undertake a study of this area of
the law lies in first explaining why it seems to have only recently invoked
controversy. The "why" should become apparent once it is recognized
that until fairly modern times, especially in England, there were other
and more basic right to counsel considerations to be resolved. Indeed,
the absolute right to retain counsel for all felonies was not guaranteed in
England until 1836;' and the right of an indigent to have counsel ap-
pointed to aid him at a criminal trial was not made absolute in the United
States until 1963,8 and has not yet achieved that status in England.'
It seems quite natural that only after those basic rights were secured
would the judiciary focus attention on the indigents' right to counsel at
collateral attack proceedings. But now that attention has focused on the
collateral attack problem, a new problem must be solved: What right
should an indigent have to appointed counsel to assist him in asserting a
collateral attack on a prior criminal conviction?
It is the purpose of this paper to help in providing an answer by:
(1) reviewing the historical development of the right to counsel; (2)
surveying the current state of the law with respect to the right of an
indigent to have counsel appointed to aid him in asserting a collateral
attack on a prior criminal conviction; (3) examining the Florida posi-
tion in this area; and (4) suggesting what, in the author's opinion, the
indigents' right in this regard ought to be.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT To COUNSEL
A. Early History to 1932
Since history has a bearing on present rights, it is necessary to place
the question of the right to counsel at collateral attack proceedings in its
most proper setting. In order to do this it seems that we must briefly
review some of the important developments of the right to counsel in the
United States."
that in federal habeas corpus proceedings instituted by a state prisoner, the district court
must hold an evidentiary hearing if the petitioner did not receive a full and fair evidentiary
hearing in a state court, wherein the state court decided the issues of fact alleged by the
petitioner. See generally Comment, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 154 (1965).
7. 6 & 7 W. 4, c. 114, § 1 (1836).
8. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
9. BEANEY, RIGHT To COUNSEL 13-14 (1955); Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1001, 1029 n.174
(1963).; JUsrc, BRITISH SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, CRIMINAL
APPEA. S 113-114 (1964).
10. In the interest of completeness the writer has summarized some of the more impor-
tant developments of the right to counsel in England in the following paragraphs.
Even though inadequate records cloud our knowledge regarding the extent of the
right as it existed in England during the middle ages, it is clear that legal assistance was
permitted during some trials. However, presentation of the case as we know it now was
unknown; in fact witnesses were not allowed in civil trials until the fifteenth century and
the date of their entry into criminal trials is unknown. Even though the date of their
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entry into criminal trials has been obscured by time, it is fairly certain that the presentation
of factual evidence by witnesses became prevalent by the sixteenth century.
However, the entry of witnesses into criminal trials brought with it a peculiar distinction
in the law dealing with the right to counsel. This distinction permitted defendants to have
attorneys aid them in pleading questions of law, but denied them the right of assistance
of counsel in the demonstration of fact. By the seventeenth century this distinction became
very rigid, and it appears by then to have been accepted as having always existed.
It is interesting that this peculiar distinction between law and fact existed only in
felony cases, whereas in misdemeanors counsel was permitted to assist in the demonstration
of facts as well as in pleading questions of law. Peculiar as this distinction appears to be,
it seems that there were reasonable grounds for its existence.
Apparently, at that time criminal law was a means used by the state to protect society
from those who were considered a threat. This was necessary due to the inadequacy of the
police force and army at the Crown's disposal. Furthermore, the basic premise in felony
cases was that the accused was guilty, and besides, it was thought, as noted by Lord Coke,
that the court as an impartial body would adequately protect the rights of the defendant.
In short the Crown was too weak and society was too insecure to permit counsel for all
purposes in felony cases, and the court was thought of as a sufficiently adequate substitute.
Although Coke was a proponent of the law-fact distinction, he was not in favor of a
trial without counsel such as the indigent defendant had in the United States case of Betts
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) ; rather he favored a trial in which counsel's role was limited
to pleading questions of law. In other words, he believed that counsel's role ought to be
limited, but that the limited right ought to be granted to all.
So in England at that time, whether or not a point of law arose was the determinative
factor as to whether a man should have counsel, not his ability to pay.
Apparently during this period all right to counsel pronouncements emanated from judicial
sources and there was no legislative activity until the late seventeenth century.
The first legislative enactment emasculating the law-fact distinction occurred in 1695,
when Parliament provided that one accused of treason had the right to retain counsel for
assistance regarding matters of fact as well as questions of law. 7 & 8 W.3c.3, 5.1 (1695).
The act also provided that the court must appoint counsel upon the request of the accused
indigent. Although a welcome development, the appointment of counsel feature of the act
was simply legislative recognition of an existing judicial fact. After 1695 further emascula-
tion occurred by judicial fiat, as the judges became more and more lenient with respect to
felonies in general, by broadening the meaning of questions of law, and by the 1800's counsel
was permitted to conduct the direct and cross examination, both of which had been tradi-
tionally connected with demonstrations of fact.
Notwithstanding this leniency, neither the law-fact distinction nor the right to have
counsel appointed with respect to felonies in general became a matter of legislative concern
until much later. Finally in the Act of 1836 the law-fact distinction was abolished with
respect to all felonies, but the striking feature of the Act was that it was limited to
retained counsel and it made no provision at all for having counsel appointed. The Act
did not preclude counsel from being appointed to assist indigents, but rather it did not
guarantee such appointment as an absolute right. Once again an anomalous situation arose,
as the legislature broadened the scope of counsel's function to include questions of fact,
it concurrently limited by inaction the previously existing right of the indigent to have
counsel appointed.
Indeed, it was not until the Poor Prisoners' Defense Act of 1903, 3 Edw. 7, c. 38, § 1
that provision was made in England for the appointment of counsel in all felonies. How-
ever, the act was once again merely legislative recognition of existing judicial practice,
and it introduced some features which actually may have had a limiting effect upon the
appointment of counsel rather than expanding it. For example, the act required the indigent
to reveal some aspects of his case to the judge before he would appoint counsel.
Its many inadequacies became apparent, but it was not until 1930 that the legislature
again acted, when it passed The Poor Prisoners' Defense Act, 1930, 20 & 21, Geo. 5, c.
32, § 1(3)(a),. The new act had as its chief improvement the mandatory appointment of
counsel for murder, however, in other felony cases appointment remained discretionary
depending upon the circumstances. The right to counsel provisions were again modified in
1949, but, to this day, except for murder, appointment of counsel rests in the discretion
of the judges. The Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51.
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To the credit of the American colonies the then prevailing English
distinction between law and fact never took hold." It was a distinction
which permitted defendants to have attorneys aid them in pleading ques-
tions of law, but denied them the right to assistance of counsel in the
demonstration of fact. 2 It precluded the assistance of counsel during
such a basic procedure as cross examination, and its unfairness was recog-
nized even then.'"
The early American courts were also progressive in dealing with
indigents, as exhibited by their tendency to appoint counsel for them
in all felony cases. However, this judicial concern did not manifest itself
in the legislature, and it seems that only in New Jersey and Connecticut
did the indigent have an absolute right to have counsel appointed in both
capital and non-capital felonies, as appointment of counsel provisions in
most states dealt only with capital offenses.' 4
In 1789 the sixth amendment was proposed to Congress and it was
ratified in 1791. Since the proposal was not accompanied by any comment
or controversy, historical analysis has been difficult. However, there are
important constitutional writers who have made judgments about the
framers' intent regarding its meaning. They seem to conclude that the
framers intended the right to counsel provision of the sixth amendment
to guarantee an absolute right to retain counsel in all criminal proceed-
ings, but to guarantee indigents an absolute right to have counsel ap-
pointed only in capital cases. 5
Although the Supreme Court did not venture an opinion as to the
meaning of the sixth amendment at any time between the period of 1791
to 1938, when the occasion arose in the famous Johnson v. Zerbst16 case,
it totally obliterated the capital-non-capital distinction and held that the
right to counsel under the sixth amendment was an absolute one, guaran-
teed to indigents and non-indigents alike in all criminal proceedings. The
precedents for Zerbst were few, but the sweeping language of the 1932
It is no wonder that an indigent's right to have counsel assist him at a collateral
attack proceedings is not an important part of the historical development of the right
to counsel in England, as the right of an indigent to have counsel appointed at trial itself
has not yet been absolutely guaranteed to all accused felons. See generally BEANEY, op. cit.
supra note at 1-36; Heidelborough & Becker, Benefit of Counsel in Criminal Cases in the
Time of Coke, 6 U. MIAMI L. Rv. 546 (1952); Comment, supra note 9 at 1022-1034.
11. BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 9 at 18.
12. For a more complete discussion of this distinction between law and fact see text
in note 10 supra.
13. E.g., Langhorn, himself a barrister, would not have been convicted of treason if
he had had the benefit of skillful cross-examination. He had failed to ask the state's witness,
Titus Oates, how his chambers were arranged, when such cross-examination would have
proven that Oates had never seen the chambers. 2 St. Tr. 874 (1679).
14. BEANwEY, op. cit. supra note 9 at 21.
15. BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 9 at 28; 11 COOLEY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITU-
Tiom 551 (4th ed. 1873) ; 11 SToRY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNsTrTuTioN 599 (3d ed. 1858).
16. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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landmark case of Powell v. Alabama17 cast the die and made Zerbst
inevitable.
From 1791, the year the sixth amendment was ratified, until 1932,
the year Powell was decided, the state and lower federal courts saw prac-
tically no cases on the right to counsel, and, though the Supreme Court
did make reference to the right to counsel in a few cases,' 8 it heard no
case in which the right to counsel figured prominently. Thus by 1932 no
case had emerged dealing with the duty of the court to appoint counsel at
any stage of the judicial proceedings. But at this time a series of events
occurred in Alabama which shocked the nation and led eventually to the
famous case of Powell v. Alabama, 9 or as it was more popularly called,
the Scottsboro Cases.
A number of Negro and white boys and two white girls were on a
train in Alabama. A fight ensued and the white boys with the exception
of one were forcibly removed.2" They informed the local authorities who
wired ahead requesting that the Negroes be removed. At the next town
the train was stopped and searched, and the youths were taken in custody
to Scottsboro, the county seat. Shortly after the train was stopped the
two white girls, in response to a leading question, told a story of being
raped by the Negro youths."'
The youths were ignorant, illiterate and were surrounded by hostile
sentiment, and under these circumstances were put on trial in six days.
The trial began a few moments after counsel, charged for the first time
with any degree of responsibility in the case, began to represent them.
Eight of nine defendants were convicted in trials completed on the same
day, and appeals to the Alabama Supreme Court were denied for seven
17. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
18. In Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 386 (1898), it was pointed out that right-to-coun-
sel procedure in America was much better than in England, and in Anderson v. Treat, 172 U.S.
24 (1898) the court upheld the judge's appointment of separate counsel for one co-defendant.
Later, in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 344 (1914), Holmes dissenting, the court rejected
the claim of a mob dominated trial, holding that the defendant "had a public trial deliberately
conducted, with the benefit of counsel for his defense," but nine years later, Holmes writing
for the court in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), asserted that where counsel, appar-
ently through fear, failed to perform even obvious duties, and where mob pressure also
affected the jury and judge, there was an obvious departure from due process. Finally in
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925), the Supreme Court reversed a conviction in
a contempt action where the lower court had failed to give the condemned an opportunity
to retain counsel.
19. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See generally PATTERSONe & CONRAD, SCOTTSBORO BOY (1950).
20. The facts narrated here are from BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 9 at 151, 152. He
obtained them from the record presented to the Supreme Court and the court's opinion.
21. In Patterson and Conrad's SCOTTSBORO Boy (1950), app. 5 (opinion of Horton, J.),
granting a motion for a new trial after one of the defendant's second conviction, is a
powerful attack on the truth of the girls' testimony. The girls' stories are also examined in
REYNOLDS, COURTROOM, THE STORY OF SAMUEL S. LEIBOWITZ 268 (1950).
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of the eight,22 the exception being a thirteen year-old boy. The Supreme
Court reversed, with Justice Sutherland writing for the Court.2"
If the legal usefulness of Supreme Court decisions were limited to
their precise holdings, then Powell's impact on future legal developments
would indeed have been small. For the holding in its most restricted sense
dealt with the even then uncontroverted proposition that embodied in the
right to counsel, retained or appointed, was the right that counsel be given
an adequate time to prepare. Here, since there was an insufficient time
allowed for counsel to prepare, the defendants were denied their right to
retain counsel. The Court further stated that under the special circum-
stances of this capital case, if counsel was not retained, then the state was
under a duty to appoint counsel, and the insufficient time allowed for
counsel to prepare constituted an ineffective appointment, and, therefore,
a breach of that duty.24
But it is not these limited holdings that caused the Powell case to
live on, for who in 1932 would have questioned the right of a person to
retain counsel or the right of an indigent illiterate Negro youth charged
with raping a white girl in Alabama, to have counsel appointed? In
addition to these limited holdings, Justice Sutherland presented an elo-
quent argument for the proposition that a fair hearing, and therefore
due process, simply can never exist unless an accused has counsel. He
stated that "Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law. . . He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him."25 Indeed,
Justice Sutherland's sweeping language indicated that he considered it
necessary to have counsel appointed for indigents in all criminal cases in
order to have a fair hearing. However, it was not until 1963, thirty-one
years later, that his dicta became law.
B. History From 1932 to Present Under the Sixth Amendment
and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
It was six years after Powell before the Supreme Court heard an-
other right to counsel case. In 1938 they were presented with a collateral
22. The one dissenting judge thought that the haste, military atmosphere, mob hostility
and lack of adequate representation constituted a denial of due process. Powell v. State,
141 So. 201, 214-15, rev'd 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
23. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
24. Id. at 71 contains the exact language of the court in this connection.
[In a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is
incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-
mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested
or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law;
and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such
circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and
trial of the case.
Another case indicating that an accused must be given a reasonable opportunity to obtain
counsel is Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954). But see Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85
(1955); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U . 444 (1940).
25. Id. at 69.
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attack proceeding brought by a convicted non-capital felon in the case of
Johnson v. Zerbst28 The Court held that, "The Sixth Amendment with-
holds from federal courts in all criminal proceedings, the power and
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or
waives the assistance of counsel."27
Since the Johnson case involved a non-capital felony, its holding
obviously encompassed all capital crimes as well.2" Although it held that
the right to counsel under the sixth amendment was an absolute one,
extending to indigents and non-indigents alike in all criminal proceedings,
its holding applied only to federal criminal proceedings. This is so be-
cause the federal constitutional provision which applied to state criminal
proceedings was the fourteenth amendment due process clause, and that
provision was not in issue in Zerbst. Furthermore, the court did not offer
any indication as to how it would decide the fourteenth amendment
question when it arose.
Thus, the right of an indigent to have counsel appointed in state
criminal proceedings remained unknown. But not for long, because in
1942 the Supreme Court was confronted with the state non-capital felony
case of Betts v. Brady.29 In a sharply divided court the majority held
that the rule of the sixth amendment was not so fundamental and essen-
tial to a fair trial that the mere refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent
defendant charged with a non-capital crime would necessarily violate the
fourteenth amendment due process clause. The court concluded that:
Asserted denial (of due process) is to be tested by an appraisal
of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one
setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to
the universal sense of justice, may in other circumstances, and
in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial.8 0
26. Note 16 supra.
27. Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
28. Even before this case it was generally assumed that the absolute right to counsel
guarantee of the sixth amendment included appointed counsel in all capital crimes, however,
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1939), was the first time the Supreme Court made a
definitive statement to that effect. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
29. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
30. Id. at 462 (Emphasis added). The Betts decision was rendered during World War
II and apparently caused a large amount of controversy, especially among legal scholars.
Indeed it prompted this passionate article in the New York Times.
Most Americans-lawyers and laymen alike-before the decision in Betts v. Brady
would have thought that the right of the accused to counsel in a serious criminal
case was unquestionably a part of our own Bill of Rights. Certainly the majority
of the Supreme Court which rendered the decision in Betts v. Brady would not
wish their decision to be used to discredit the significance of that right and the
importance of its observance.
Yet at a critical period in world history, Betts v. Brady dangerously tilts the
scales against safeguarding one of the most precious rights of man. For in a
free world no man should be condemned to penal servitude for years without
having the right to counsel to defend him. The right to counsel for the poor as
well as the rich, is an indispensable safeguard of freedom and justice under law.
Benjamin v. Cohen & Erwin N. Griswold, N.Y. Times August 2, 1942.
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It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court in both the federal
sixth amendment Zerbst case and the state fourteenth amendment Betts
case relied in part on the Powell decision, which like Betts, was decided
under the fourteenth amendment. Yet Zerbst under the sixth amendment
held that the right to appointed counsel was absolute, whereas Betts
under the fourteenth amendment held that the right was merely discre-
tionary depending upon the "totality of facts in a given case."3
For the next two decades the various courts operated under the Betts
totality of facts doctrine, although the Supreme Court seemingly emas-
culated its own rule as it found a denial of fourteenth amendment due
process in almost every case it heard where the indigent had been denied
counsel at trial. 2 Even in Bute v. Illinois"3 where the court did not find
any special circumstances requiring the appointment of counsel it stated
that "if these charges had been capital charges, the court would have been
required, both by the state statute and the decisions of this Court inter-
preting the Fourteenth Amendment, to take some such steps.""4 Although
It is interesting to note that the article stated that right to counsel should not be
denied simply because a man is poor. This is the very rationale that was used by the
Supreme Court in the very recent case of Douglas v. California 372 U.S. 359 (1963). See
text accompanying note 42 infra.
31. Id. at 462.
32. This fact was noted by Justice Harlan in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 350-
51 (1963) (concurring opinion).
In noncapital cases, the "special circumstances" rule has continued to exist in form
while its substance has been substantially and steadily eroded. In the first decade
after Betts, there were cases in which the Court found special circumstances to be
lacking, but usually by a sharply divided vote. However, no such decision has
been cited to us, and I have found none, after Quicksali v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660,
decided in 1950. At the same time, there have been not a few cases in which special
circumstances were found in little or nothing more than the "complexity" of the
legal questions presented, although those questions were often of only routine
difficulty. The court has come to recognize, in other words, that the mere existence
of a serious criminal charge constituted in itself special circumstances requiring the
services of counsel at trial. In truth the Betts v. Brady rule is no longer a reality.
For other cases finding a denial of due process where the accused did not have the
benefit of counsel, see Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959) (Defendant, a twenty year
old farm boy, lacked necessary knowledge to deal with rules of evidence.) ; Moore v. Michi-
gan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) (Since there was a threat of mob violence, inter alia, the seventeen
year old Negro youth did not make an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.)r; Massey
v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954) (Accused was insane at the time of the trial.); Palmer
v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951) (Defendant, an irresponsible youth, was tricked into pleading
guilty to a serious charge.) ; Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949),. (Prejudicial errors indi-
cated no fair trial.); Uneges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948) (no evidence indicating
that the accused understood the consequences of pleading guilty) ; Townsend v. Burke, 334
U.S. 736 (1948). (In pronouncing sentence the court made an erroneous assumption regarding
the defendant's prior criminal record.); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948) (Accused was
an inexperienced youth, unfamiliar with court procedure.); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561
(1947) (Accused did not understand English, and the arresting officer was one of the
two interpreters at trial.).
For cases, in addition to Betts, finding no denial of due process where accused did not
have benefit of counsel see Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950); Bute v. Illinois, 333
U.S. 640 (1948); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1946); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173
(1946).
33. 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
34. Id. at 674.
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prior to Bute there was no case which held that the appointment of coun-
sel in all capital cases was required by the fourteenth amendment, the
court now assumed that such a mandate had indeed existed.85
Another interesting development which occurred during this period
dealt with the particular point in the proceedings at which lack of counsel
would place the indigent defendant at a disadvantage. It occurred in 1961
in Hamilton v. Alabama,16 wherein the Supreme Court for the first time
considered the indigent's right to counsel at a time other than trial. The
petitioner, who was tried and convicted of a capital crime, was denied
counsel at arraignment, which under Alabama law was a critical stage in
the criminal proceedings. It was critical because defenses such as insanity
and systematic exclusion of one race from grand juries had to be pleaded
at or before arraignment or possibly be lost.
The Court cited Powell v. Alabama, and held "that an accused in a
capital case requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him."18 7 Although it was limited to capital cases, the
Hamilton Court did affirmatively increase the indigents' right to counsel,
as it for the first time established that the right existed prior to trial.
However, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's emasculation of
the Betts doctrine, the Bute dicta regarding capital crimes, and the Ham-
ilton expansion of that dicta to all critical stages of the criminal proceed-
ings, in 1961 there were still fifteen states that did not grant an absolute
right to indigents to have counsel appointed to aid them in all criminal
proceedings."8 But two years later in 1963 the Supreme Court decided
Gideon v. Wainwright," a state case in which the indigent, who was not
represented by counsel at trial, was convicted of a non-capital felony.
Though the Gideon court agreed with the Betts court that only "a pro-
vision of the Bill of Rights which is fundamental and essential to a fair
trial is made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth amendment,"40
it overruled Betts and held that the sixth amendment right to counsel
provision was one of those fundamental rights.
The initial impact of Gideon was enormous, especially in those states
where many convicted indigent felons were not provided with counsel to
aid them during the criminal proceedings.41 Yet the Supreme Court was
35. But see, Powell v. Alabama, note 25 supra and accompanying text.
36. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
37. Id. at 54.
38. Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mis-
sissippi, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
and Vermont. McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 121-22 (1961) (appendix to concurring
opinion).
39. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
40. Id. at 342.
41. For example Florida adopted a new post-conviction remedy to meet the situation.
See note 95 infra.
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not satisfied with this momentous decision and it decided to take an
additional step in favor of indigents.
On the same day that Gideon was decided, the Court in Douglas
v. California,"2 extended the indigents' right to have counsel appointed to
the first criminal appeal provided by the state as a matter of right. Since
then, there have been no significant right to counsel decisions that have
emanated from the Supreme Court.
C. Development of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause in State Criminal Cases
The Douglas v. California43 decision was not unexpected, but it did
create interest because it was the first right to counsel case that was
predicated on the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause. But
it was not the first state criminal case that was based on equal protection;
in fact it was not even the first right to counsel case in which it appeared
as an argument, for in Justice Black's dissenting opinion in 1942 in Betts
v. Brady,44 after pointing out that Indiana has provided an absolute right
to appointed counsel in criminal trials since 1854, he concluded that
most of the other States have shown their argument (that coun-
sel is essential to all accused, to the court and to the public) by
constitutional provisions, statutes, or established practice judi-
cially approved, which assure that no man be deprived of coun-
sel merely because of his poverty. Any other practice seems to
me to defeat the promise of our democratic society to provide
equal justice under the law.45
In 1956 in Griffin v. Illinois,4" the equal protection argument finally
gained majority status in a state criminal case. In a five to four opinion
the Supreme Court held that a state with an appellate procedure which
made available trial transcripts to those who were able to pay for them
was constitutionally required to provide "means of affording adequate
and effective appellate review to indigent defendants."47 Justice Black,
this time writing for the majority, argued that "due process and equal
protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no
invidious discriminations between persons and different groups of per-
sons.Y48 He then stated that "(i)n criminal trials a state can no more
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race or
42. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
43. Ibid.
44. 316 U.S. 455, 474 (1942) (dissenting opinion).
45. Id. at 477. (Emphasis added.)
46. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
47. Id. at 20.
48. Id. at 17.
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color; ... (p)lainly the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational
relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence .... .49
Although he admitted that a state is not required by the Federal
Constitution to grant appellate review, he unequivocally declared "that
is not to say a State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way
that discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty."" ° Thus, if appellate review is made an integral part of the
criminal process, the due process and equal protection clauses protect
against invidious discriminations at that stage of the proceedings as well.
Two years later in Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board" the court
struck down another state appellate procedure, which had granted power
to the trial judge to withhold a trial transcript from an indigent upon the
finding that "justice would not be promoted . . . in that defendant has
been accorded a fair and impartial trial, and in the Court's opinion no
grave or prejudicial errors occurred therein."52 In a per curium decision
the court held that "the conclusion of the trial judge that there was no
reversible error in the trial cannot be an adequate substitute for the right
to full appellate review available to all defendants ... who can afford the
expense of a transcript.
5 3
The court extended the Griffin doctrine in Burns v. Ohio,54 involving
a twenty dollar fee for filing a motion for leave to appeal a felony con-
viction to the Ohio Supreme Court. The granting of leave to appeal was
discretionary with the Ohio Supreme Court. Chief Justice Warren's
opinion held that "(The Griffin) principle is no less applicable where
the state has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of
its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second
phase of that procedure solely because of his indigency." 5 The holding
clearly indicated that the fact that this second appeal was discretionary
did not negate the applicability of the equal protection clause.
Then in Smith v. Bennett,5" the Supreme Court was faced with a
state procedure that required an indigent prisoner to pay a filing fee of
four dollars before his application for a writ of habeas corpus would be
allowed. The court made it clear that the Griffin principles extended
beyond direct appeals from criminal convictions to state post-conviction
proceedings such as habeas corpus. Thus, the post-conviction filing fee
49. Id. at 17-18.
50. Id. at 18.
51. 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
52. Id. at 215.
53. Id. at 216.
54. 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
55. Id. at 257.
56. 365 U.S. 708 (1960).
[VOL. XIX
COMMENTS
requirement was a violation of equal protection, since it would preclude
indigents from using post-conviction remedies solely because of their
poverty.
Finally in Lane v. Brown,57 decided the same day as Douglas, the
court considered the Indiana Public Defender Act. Under the act, if an
indigent prisoner was denied relief at a corum nobis hearing and if the
public defender refused to appeal because he believed it would be unsuc-
cessful, then the act precluded the indigent from procuring a transcript
of the hearing and having other counsel appointed to perfect an appeal.
In short, because of the public defender's refusal to represent him, the
indigent was precluded from appealing.
The Court first noted that "in Eskridge ... a provision which per-
mitted a trial judge to prevent an indigent from taking an effective ap-
peal""8 was held violative of the fourteenth amendment. It then held that
"[T]he provision before us confers upon a state officer outside the judicial
system power to take from an indigent all hope of any appeal at all.
Such a procedure, based on indigency alone, does not meet constitutional
standards."5
To summarize, the equal protection rational, as enunciated by the
cases, prevents the state from invidiously discriminating, and in criminal
cases discrimination on account of poverty is deemed to be invidious
discrimination. Thus, a procedure to which equal protection applies and
to which the indigent is precluded, solely because of his poverty, is con-
stitutionally invalid.
Though equal protection has been applied to the right to counsel
procedure only once, where the appeal was the first and only one as a
matter of right, 0 it has not been so limited with respect to other state
criminal procedures. Indeed, it has been applied to declare invalid a filing
fee in both a state post-conviction proceedings,6' and in a second appeal
even though the state had already provided one review on the merits as
a matter of right. 2 Furthermore, equal protection has invalidated pro-
cedures in one jurisdiction which permitted a trial judge" and in another
jurisdiction a public defender 4 from effectively precluding the indigent
from appealing, where in neither jurisdiction were there similar proce-
dures which applied to non-indigents.
57. 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
58. Id. at 485.
59. Ibid.
60. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
61. Supra note 56.
62. Supra note 54.
63. Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
64. Supra note 57.
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III. SURVEY OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW WITH RESPECT
To THE RIGHT OF AN INDIGENT To HAVE COUNSEL APPOINTED
To AID HIM IN ASSERTING A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A PRIOR
CRIMINAL CONVICTION
A. Current Status of the Applicable Federal Constitutional
Provisions
Since Douglas v. California was based on the fourteenth amendment
equal protection clause, it initiated a constitutional argument for the right
to counsel which was not subject to the delimitations of the fourteenth
amendment due process clause. In fact, it represented a point of view
which if fully developed could substantially increase the scope of the
indigents' right to counsel.
This is so because the sixth amendment was expressly limited to
criminal proceedings, and the right to counsel under the fourteenth
amendment due process clause in criminal proceedings* was interpreted
to have the same meaning as the right to counsel embodied in the sixth
amendment. 5 A fortiori, under the fourteenth amendment due process
clause the absolute right to have counsel appointed was limited to crim-
inal proceedings. Furthermore, the fourteenth amendment due process
clause was the only constitutional provision that was applicable in deal-
ing with state right to counsel problems. However, the equal protection
clause used in Douglas has now made available a new constitutional pro-
vision to deal with state right to counsel problems, and it is one which
has not been limited to criminal proceedings.
The importance of the Douglas equal protection rationale with re-
spect to post-conviction remedies lies in the fact that they traditionally
have been construed to be civil in nature, 6 even when they are used to
collaterally attack a prior criminal conviction. 7 Consequently, courts
have maintained that indigents asserting such remedies are not within the
scope of the absolute right to counsel guarantee of the sixth amendment"
or the fourteenth amendment due process clause. 9 However, the courts
who choose to use it, now have the equal protection clause as a constitu-
tional vehicle to aid the indigent. And it is one which apparently is not
precluded simply because an action may be labeled civil in nature.
Although the Douglas rationale represented a possible means of ex-
panding the scope of the indigent's right to counsel, it should be empha-
sized that the Supreme Court specifically limited its holding to first
65. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
66. Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556 (1883).
67. Cases cited notes 69 and 76 infra.
68. Cases cited note 76 infra.
69. E.g., State v. Weeks, 166 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1963); State v. Herron, 376 S.W.2d 192
(Mo. 1964); Jones v. State, 142 Mont. 619, 386 P.2d 74 (1963).
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appeals as a matter of right. Thus state and lower federal courts which
choose to ignore Douglas, would not be incorrect in asserting that its
holding was neither expressly nor impliedly binding in post-conviction
proceedings.
This is true even considering that the Supreme Court has now con-
strued the indigents' right to counsel as absolute in federal criminal
trials,7  federal criminal appeals, 71 state criminal trials involving serious
crimes72 and state criminal appeals where the appeal is the first and only
one as a matter of right.78 For notwithstanding the above guarantees, the
Supreme Court has not indicated any policy regarding the right to counsel
in collateral attack proceedings.
B. The Views Expressed by Various Jurisdictions
Although the Supreme Court has not yet made any pronouncements
in this regard, the lower federal courts and many state courts have not
been silent. Indeed no less than twenty-five jurisdictions have passed on
the issue, of which fourteen74 have held, like Florida7' and the lower
federal courts,7" that the indigents' right to counsel while collaterally
attacking a prior criminal conviction is discretionary. This position has
been enunciated as follows:
Whether counsel should be appointed will turn on the decision
of the trial court regarding the presence of substance in the
movant's claims and the need for legal assistance in view of the
complexities that might arise in the course of a hearing, if a
hearing is found nesessary.77
In other words, the jurisdictions with this point of view hold that the
70. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)..
71. Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957). This right to counsel is a statutory
one, granted under In Forma Pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1957). If the appeal is frivolous
and in bad faith counsel may be denied, but then the indigent has a right to counsel to
present and argue the good faith and frivolous issues. Thus, the right to counsel is absolute
on appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
72. Note 65 supra.
73. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
74. For the federal court citations, see cases cited note 76 infra; Ex parte Norris, 168
So.2d 242 (Ala. 1964); People v. Shipman, 33 U.S. L. Week 2401 (Cal. Feb. 15, 1965); State
v. Weeks, 166 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1964) ; Freeman v. State, 392 P.2d 542 (Idaho 1964); McCary
v. State, 241 Ind. 518, 173 N.E.2d 300 (1961),; Loftis v. Amrine, 152 Kan. 464, 105 P.2d
890 (1940) ; Sherrill v. Commonwealth, 323 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1959); Brine v. State, 205 A.2d
12 (Me. 1964); State v. Perra, 262 Minn. 572, 115 N.W.2d 680 (1962); State v. Herron,
376 S.W.2d 192 (Mo. 1964),; Jones v. State, 142 Mont. 619, 386 P.2d 74 (1963); People v.
Breslin, 4 N.Y.2d 73, 149 N.E.2d 85, 172 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1958); Frimstone v. Meyers, 202
Pa. Super. 292, 196 A.2d 209 (1963).
75. State v. Weeks, 166 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1963).
76. E.g., Baker v. United States, 334 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1964); Barker v. Ohio, 330
F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1964),; Gresham v. United States, 329 F.2d 779 (10th Cir. 1964).
77. State v. Weeks, supra note 75 at 896.
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right to have counsel appointed is discretionary even when the collateral
attack movant has been granted a post-conviction hearing.7"
These jurisdictions seem to base their position on the rationale that
all post-conviction proceedings are civil, not criminal in nature and there-
fore do not fall within the absolute right to counsel guarantee of the sixth
amendment or fourteenth amendment due process clause.79
Furthermore, six of these jurisdictions have decided the question
post-Douglas, and four either positively or by negative implication have
asserted that the absolute right to counsel under the equal protection
clause is also limited to criminal proceedings, and, therefore, does not
encompass post-conviction remedies, even when they are used to collater-
ally attack a prior criminal conviction. The other two post-Douglas juris-
dictions have extended this discretionary right to counsel to a point where
it is almost absolute. They hold that once a collateral attack hearing
has been granted, the state is under an absolute duty to appoint counsel
to represent the indigent, but before that point no absolute right exists."0
Thus, in these states the right to counsel is discretionary only in the
sense that the court may deny the petitioner's motion for a hearing, if
for example, the petition is frivolous.
The remaining eleven jurisdictions that have passed on the issue are
composed of two minority views, each diametrically opposed to the other.
At one end of the spectrum six8" jurisdictions refuse to permit to their
indigents any constitutional right to counsel. They seem to hold that post-
conviction proceedings are civil in nature and, therefore, the indigents
have no constitutional right to have counsel appointed. Two courts in-
dicated that because the proceedings were civil in nature it not only had
no power to appoint counsel, but it also was powerless to direct payment
of fees for such counsel out of public funds.8 2
At the other end of the minority spectrum five jurisdictions, all by
statute, 8 have extended the absolute right to have counsel appointed to
78. For those jurisdictions which hold that the indigents' right to counsel becomes
absolute once a hearing is granted, see cases cited note 80 infra.
79. Ex parte Norris, 168 So.2d 242 (Ala. 1964); State v. Weeks, 166 So.2d 892 (Fla.
1964); Freeman v. State, 392 P.2d 542 (Idaho 1964); State v. Herron, 376 S.W.2d 192
(Mo. 1964); Frimstone v. Meyers, 202 Pa. Super. 292, 196 A.2d 209 (1963),.
80. People v. Shipman, 33 U.S. L. Week 2401 (Cal. Feb. 15, 1965); Brine v. State,
205 A.2d 12 (Me. 1964).
81. Dutton v. Eyman, 387 P.2d 799 (Ariz. 1963); McGrath v. Tinsley, 328 P.2d 579 (Cal.
1958); Waldon v. District Court, 130 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1964); Wright v. Eckle, 76 Ohio
L. Abs. 232, 146 N.E.2d 890 (Ohio App. 1957); In re Mears, 198 A.2d 27 (Vt. 1964); Williams
v. State, 393 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1964).
82. McGrath v. Tinsley, supra note 81; In re Mears, supra note 81.
83. ILL. RFv. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-4 (1963); MD. ANN. CODE, art., § 645(e) (1964); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ch. 15, § 15-219 (1953); ORE. R.v. STAir. ch. 138, § 138, 590(2) (1963); Wyo.
STAT. ANNr. § 7-408-4 (1963) The Maryland act is typical:
The petition may allege that the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the pro-
ceedings or to employ counsel. If the Court is satisfied that the allegation is true,
it shall order that the petitioner proceed as an indigent, and appoint counsel for him.
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all collateral attack proceedings, and in one jurisdiction it was ruled that
the appointment was mandatory even when the petition submitted ap-
peared frivolous. 4
The recent Gideon v. Wainwright5 and Douglas v. California"8 de-
cisions have demonstrated the awareness of the Supreme Court to the
problems of indigents. But this has not resulted in any wholesale change
in attitude in the states-especially in those where the right of an indigent
to have counsel appointed has been declared discretionary."s A few states,
however, which previously declared that the indigent has no constitutional
right to appointed counsel at post-conviction proceedings have altered
their position.88 Illinois"9 did it by statute, and now grants an absolute
right to the indigent. In Idaho, 90 MontanaO' and Pennsylvania 2 it was
done by judicial fiat, but the right granted in each case was a discretion-
ary one to be determined on an ad hoc basis.
IV. THE FLORIDA POSITION WITH RESPECT To THE RIGHT OF
AN INDIGENT To HAVE COUNSEL APPOINTED To AID HIM IN
ASSERTING A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A PRIOR CRIMINAL
CONVICTION 93
Florida is the state in which Clarence Earl Gideon was convicted
of a crime without the benefit of counsel, and, consequently, was the
birthplace of the famous Gideon v. Wainwright94 case which held that
the absolute right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment in all
criminal proceedings was so fundamental and essential to a fair trial that
it was made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth amendment
due process clause.
Since Florida was one of those states which did not provide counsel
for all of its indigent defendants, the Gideon decision immediately gave
rise to an important new ground for collateral attack relief. To meet its
84. Henry v. Warden, 221 Md. 606, 156 A.2d 669 (1959) ; Hobbs v. Warden, 219 Md.
684, 148 A.2d 380 (1959) ; Byrd v. Warden, 219 Md 681, 147 A.2d 701 (1959). See generally
Note, 19 MD. L. REV. 233 (1950).
85. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
86. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
87. But see cases cited note 80 supra.
88. This footnote sets forth the authority for the former position and the number of
each footnote containing the authority for the new position. Ross v. Ragen, 391 Ill. 419,
63 N.E.2d 874 (1945); Contra, note 89 infra; Cobas v. Clapp, 79 Idaho 419, 319 P.2d 475
(1957), Contra, note 90 infra; In re Pelke's Petition, 139 Mont. 620, 365 P.2d 932 (1961) ;
Contra, note 91 infra, Johnson v. Burke, 173 Pa. Super. 105, 93 A.2d 876 (1953), Contra,
note 92 infra.
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-4 (1963).
90. Freeman v. State, 392 P.2d 542 (Idaho 1964).
91. Jones v. State, 142 Mont. 619, 386 P.2d 74 (1963).
92. Frimstone v. Meyers, 202 Pa. Super. 292, 196 A.2d 209 (1963).
93. The Florida position is examined in detail because it represents a typical point of
view, and because it is our obligation to do so, this being a Florida law review.
94. Note 85 supra.
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potentially enormous impact the Supreme Court of Florida promulgated
Criminal Procedure Rule 1,11 the Florida adaptation of Title 28, Section
2255 U.S.C.A.,96 to provide an effective post-conviction remedy coequal
with, but actually more expeditious than, post-conviction habeas corpus.
It was evident that the Florida courts would soon be faced with a
multitude of Rule 1 petitions, and that among them would be lurking the
question of what right an indigent has to appointed counsel to aid him
in a collateral attack proceeding. Indeed within a short period of time all
three of the Florida intermediate appellate districts were faced with that
very question. They were uniform in holding that an indigent has an
absolute right to the assistance of counsel in a post-conviction proceed-
ings," and all seemed to base their decision on the broad implications in
the recent cases of the Supreme Court dealing with the right to counsel,
such as Gideon and Douglas.
95. Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1, hereinafter to be cited as-Rule 1-was approved
and adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida in 1963. In Re Criminal Procedure Rule 1,
151 So.2d 634 (Fla. 1963) . It provides as follows:
Rule No. 1. Motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence; hearing; appeal
A prisoner in custody under Sentence of a court established by the Laws of
Florida claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution or Laws of the United States, or of the
State of Florida, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,
or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is other-
wise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence
to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that
the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served
upon the prosecuting attorney of the court, grant a prompt hearing thereon, deter-
mine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect
thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or
that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral
attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional
rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack,
the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner
or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appro-
priate.
A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the
production of the prisoner at the hearing.
The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive
motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
An appeal may be taken to the appropriate appellate court from the order
entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas
corpus.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this rule, shall not be enter-
tained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to
the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it
also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention.
This rule shall not apply to municipal courts.
The foregoing rule shall become effective upon the filing of this order.
[Order filed April 1, 1963.)
96. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958). The text of this federal post-conviction remedy is almost
identical to Rule 1, note 95, supra.
97. Keur v. State, 160 So.2d 546 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); Mullins v. State, 157 So.2d 701
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1964); Weeks v. State, 156 So.2d 36 (Fla. 3d Dist.), rev'd, 166 So.2d 892
(Fla. 1964).
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Their position was well stated in Weeks v. State, a third district
case in which the court declared in a per curium opinion:
We are reluctant to add to an already onerous burden thrust
upon the taxpayers of Florida. At the same time we would be
less than discerning if we did not recognize the broad implica-
tions in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
treating this subject.
Since it has been decided that a failure to provide counsel for an
indigent on a direct review of his conviction is a violation of his
constitutional rights, we think it reasonable to conclude that it
would be no less a violation of those rights to deny him counsel
on appellate review of collateral proceedings attacking his con-
viction on constitutional grounds."
The state apparently was not pleased with the holding of the three
District Courts of Appeal, and decided to appeal third district's order
to the Supreme Court of Florida; the order had granted the indigent's
request that counsel be appointed to assist him in the Rule 1 proceedings.
The order of The Third District Court of Appeal was quashed and
the Supreme Court of Florida in Weeks v. State99 held what is now the
rule of Florida: The indigent who is unable to retain counsel has no
absolute right to the assistance of appointed counsel at a hearing on a
Rule 1 motion or on appeal from an adverse ruling thereon, but fifth
amendment due process 00 requires the assistance of appointed counsel if
under the circumstances such assistance would be essential to accomplish
a fair and thorough presentation of the prisoner's claims.
The holding of the court in Weeks was based on the premise that
Rule 1 and all other post-conviction proceedings "are in the nature of
independent, collateral civil actions which are not clothed with the
aspects of a 'criminal prosecution' under the sixth amendment."'01
In reaching its decision the court relied on the traditional rationale
98. Weeks v. State, supra note 97, at 38 (emphasis added).
99. 166 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1964).
'100. Since the Weeks case dealt with a state procedure, it is interesting to note the court's
reference to the fifth amendment due process clause. It seems that reference to the fourteenth
amendment due process clause would have been more appropriate as the fourteenth amend-
ment is applicable to the states, whereas the fifth amendment is applicable only to the
federal government. This would be true even if the court was a proponent of the incorpora-
tion school, i.e., a proponent of the theory that the entire Bill of Rights, including the fifth
amendment due process clause, was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment.
It is true that in a fact pattern similar to the instant case, these so-called incorporation-
ists would probably mention fifth amendment due process-but only in terms of it having
been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. Proponents of the incorporation theory
include the first Justice Harlan who took that position in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78, 117 (1908), and Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge as indicated in Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72, 124 (1947) (dissenting opinions).
101. State v. Weeks, 166 So.2d 892, 896 (Fla. 1964).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
used by many courts when faced with this problem. First, it pointed out
that Rule 1 was simply a Florida adoption of Section 2255,1°2 a federal
post-conviction remedy. Therefore, the court concluded, it was justified
in applying the federal post-conviction remedy precedents to the situation
at hand, and these precedents have unanimously held that post-conviction
proceedings are civil in nature, even though they involve attacks upon
criminal convictions. Thus Rule 1 is civil in nature, and as such is not a
step in a criminal prosecution; therefore, it does not fall within the abso-
lute right to counsel guarantee of the sixth amendment.
The court then faced the third district's rationale that the broad im-
plications of Gideon and Douglas negated these prior federal post-con-
viction remedy precedents and required an absolute right to counsel at
all post-conviction proceedings. The higher court rejected that point of
view as follows:
(The District Court of Appeal) had the view that the right to
counsel announced in ... (Gideon and Douglas) modified the
holdings of the prior federal cases governing Section 2255, post-
conviction remedies. We think this distinction is not valid in
view of the fact that when the prior federal decisions announced
the federal post-conviction rule there was a constitutional en-
titlement to counsel in all criminal prosecutions in the federal
courts °.
From this the court found no difficulty in concluding that "Gideon
and Douglas changed the rule for state courts in regard to direct criminal
proceedings only." 0
The court then stated another basis for its holding. In doing so it
took a positive approach and asserted that not only were neither Gideon
nor Douglas applicable, but in addition the Supreme Court had actually
declared itself against granting an absolute right to appointed counsel
at collateral attack proceedings. To support this assertion the Florida
court looked to Sanders v. United States, 05 a case decided about one
month after Gideon and Douglas. The right to counsel was not in issue
in Sanders, but it did contain the following statement.
However, we think it clear that the sentencing court has discre-
tion to ascertain whether the claim is substantial before granting
a full evidentiary hearing. In this connection, the sentencing
court might find it useful to appoint counsel to represent the
applicant. 06
102. Note 96 supra.
103. Note 101 supra.
104. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
105. 373 U.S. 1 (1963). The question involved was whether a Section 2255 movant was
entitled to a hearing on a second Section 2255 motion regarding an issue he could have raised
ou his first Section 2255 motion.
106. Id. at 21. (Emphasis added.)
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From this the Florida court concluded that the United States Su-
preme Court held that the indigent was not entitled to the assistance of
counsel as a matter of absolute right.
Though the holding of the Supreme Court of Florida may be con-
trary to one's sense of justice, it cannot be criticized as legally wrong.'0 7
For the court obviously believed that its decision would serve society best
and it did have a multitude of precedent in its favor. Moreover, the
United States Supreme Court had not issued any mandate which would
require a different result. In fact, in its latest and most closely related
right to counsel decision, Douglas v. California,0 8 the Supreme Court
expressly limited its holding to first appeals as a matter of right.
Indeed it is this express limitation in Douglas which gives rise to
the major criticism of the Weeks case. And that is the Florida court's
use of Sanders v. United States'09 as representing a policy statement by
the Supreme Court regarding the right to counsel at collateral attack
proceedings. It seems unreasonable that the Supreme Court in Sanders,
a case where right to counsel was not even in issue, would make a major
policy decision regarding the right to counsel, when in Douglas, a case
where right to counsel was directly in issue, it expressly refused to do so.
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF COLLATERAL ATTACK PROCEEDINGS AND THE
NEED FOR COUNSEL To INSURE THEIR EFFECTIVE USE
The need for collateral attack proceedings is great. Obviously the
incarcerated victim of an illegal conviction should be permitted a remedy
to enable him to remain alive or regain his freedom. Likewise, the victim
who has "paid his unjust debt to society" and who is now a free man is
also entitled to relief. He, in addition to being labeled an ex-convict, will
probably have to face various social and economic consequences if the
illegal conviction stands, even though he has served his sentence. He may
lose the right to vote or hold office and he may be barred from the practice
of such professions as law- or medicine." 0 Furthermore, his conviction
may subject him to stiffer penalties under habitual criminal statutes for
any subsequent convictions. And it may even lead to additional imprison-
ment, as after his release another jurisdiction may incarcerate him on
the ground that the prior criminal act for which he was convicted violated
an earlier parole or prohibition."'
Since collateral attack proceedings are so important, it seems that
107. Indeed it is contrary to the writer's sense of justice as indicated in sections V and
VI of this paper.
108. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
109. Supra note 105.
110. See Note, 57 Nw. U.L. Rav. 467 (1962); Note, 63 YALE L.J. 115 (1953); Note, 37
VA. L. REv. 105 (1951); Note, 59 YALE L.J. 786 (1950).
111. Ibid.
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we ought to guarantee their effectiveness to all who may need them. To
achieve this the writer submits that representation by counsel is required.
In prosecuting his remedy the collateral attack petitioner will have
to face complex legal problems concerning the burden of proof and the
admissibility of evidence. These seem to be beyond the skill of one with-
out legal training. Moreover, the petitioners, especially the incarcerated
ones, will be at a decided disadvantage in building their cases without a
lawyer, as they lack the skill and training necessary to discover new
evidence and to evaluate facts.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of collateral attack proceedings is
not sufficiently guaranteed to all, even in those jurisdictions where counsel
is appointed absolutely after a finding by the judge that the alleged claim
is not frivolous." 2 For it seems that counsel is just as necessary to aid
in determining the validity of the claim as it is in other apects of the
proceedings.
In fact in Lane v. Brown"'3 the Supreme Court frowned upon condi-
tioning a grant of counsel upon a showing of merit; it stated that this
defeats the very purpose for which counsel is sought. The point is cor-
rectly made. For conditioning the grant of counsel on merit seems to
presuppose that all petitioners know what their rights are and how to
assert them, at least to the extent that each can prepare an unfrivolous
petition. Empirical data has not been found to support that supposition.
Most jurisdictions have refused to appoint counsel for all collateral
attack movants." 4 They seem to base their refusal upon two arguments.
First, that to do so would cause a substantial increase in costs, and sec-
ondly that collateral attack proceedings are civil in nature and, therefore,
outside the absolute right to counsel guarantee of the sixth amendment
and fourteenth amendment due process clause.
The first argument, that appointing counsel for all collateral attack
movants would cause a substantial increase in costs, is not necessarily
true. In fact the ultimate result may be a savings to the state of time and
money. By appointing counsel both poorly pleaded and difficult to under-
stand petitions would disappear, and an attorney would be more likely
than an indigent convicted felon to bring all available grounds to the
attention of the court at one time. This, of course, would result in a re-
duction of the number of collateral attack hearings that would have to
be held.
Furthermore, the presence of an attorney would give the post-con-
viction judgment a-greater degree of finality, as without counsel it would
112. See cases cited note 80 supra.
113. 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
114. See cases cited notes 74, 76 and 81, and accompanying text supra.
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be very difficult to find that the indigent has lost or waived some of his
rights by his failure to present facts known to him. Thus, without counsel,
especially in light of two recent Supreme Court decisions," 5 any new
claim even if based on previously known facts, may receive a full eviden-
tiary hearing. The necessity of these subsequent hearings could be sub-
stantially reduced if attorneys were appointed to make sure that all issues
were adequately presented.
The other major reason why the absolute right to counsel has not
been guaranteed to indigents asserting collateral attacks is because they
have been categorized as civil in nature."' Therefore they have been held
to be without the scope of the absolute right to counsel guarantee of the
sixth amendment'" and the fourteenth amendment due process clause." 8
Though collateral attack proceedings have been classified as civil
in nature, they actually are a very important part of criminal procedure.
They are no less an important part of the proceedings than arraign-
ment, n1 9 trial z° or first appeal 2' as of right, all of which are stages of
the proceedings at which the absolute right to counsel is guaranteed.
Indeed, at the collateral attack stage of the proceedings federal con-
stitutional rights may be raised and ruled upon, perhaps for the first time.
Furthermore, the collateral attack stage is similar to the appeal stage of
the proceedings in that the function of both is to cause a reversal of the
prior criminal conviction.
The importance of collateral attack proceedings and their close
relationship to other stages of criminal proceedings was even recognized
in a decision by the Comptroller General of the United States.' 2' The
United States Attorney General wanted to know if habeas corpus peti-
tioners bringing suit under the federal in forma pauperis'28 statute could
have their expenses paid from funds authorized for criminal proceedings
only. 2 4 The Comptroller General answered as follows:
115. In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), the court held that even the unexcused
failure of a state prisoner to make timely use of state post-conviction remedies does not bar
relief under the federal habeas corpus statute 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958) ; and in Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), Warren, Ch. J., writing for the court held, inter alia, that in
federal habeas corpus proceedings instituted by a state prisoner, the district court must hold
an evidentiary hearing if the petitioner did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in
a state court, wherein the state court decided the issues of fact alleged by the petitioner. See
generally Comment, 40 N.Y.L. REV. 154, 170-172 (1965).
116. Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556 (1883).
117. E.g., Baker v. United States, 334 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1964); Barker v. Ohio, 330
F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1964); Gresham v. United States, 329 F.2d 779 (10th Cir. 1964).
118. E.g., State v. Weeks, 166 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1963); State v. Herron, 376 S.W.2d 192
(Mo. 1964) ; Jones v. State, 142 Mont. 619, 386 P.2d 74 (1963).
119. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
120. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
121. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
122. 39 DEcs. Comp. 133 (1959).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1958).
124. FED. R. Cam. P. 17(b).
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That habeas corpus proceedings are civil actions is well settled
• . . While we know of no basis upon which the United States
may be charged witness costs in civil proceedings, the writ of
habeas corpus is so related to the protection of constitutional
rights afforded indigent defendants by Rule 17(b), that to ig-
nore that rule in a habeas corpus proceeding under the pauper's
statute may well raise grave questions of constitutionality.'
Thus, the federal government has agreed to pay the costs incurred by an
indigent bringing "civil proceedings" out of a fund authorized for criminal
proceedings only.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are two avenues open to the Supreme Court to bring collateral
attack proceedings within the absolute right to counsel guarantee of the
federal constitution. It could be done by use of the sixth amendment and
fourteenth amendment due process clause or by use of the fourteenth
amendment equal protection clause.'26
If the sixth amendment approach is used, collateral attack proceed-
ings would have to be labeled criminal in nature, at least for right to
counsel purposes, because the sixth amendment is expressly limited to
criminal proceedings. This could be done by expanding the critical stage
of the proceedings doctrine enunciated in Hamilton v. Alabama.2 ' In that
case counsel was held to be absolutely necessary at arraignment because
it was a critical stage of the proceedings. It was held to be critical be-
cause, inter alia, the indigent could lose certain defenses if not then
pleaded.
How can collateral attack proceedings be considered any less critical
than arraignment? At both stages the concern is to insure that the indi-
gent has the ability to be able effectively to assert his rights. The major
difference between the two is that at arraignment the inability to assert
all defenses may result in a loss of life or liberty, whereas at a collateral
attack proceedings the indigent has already lost his liberty and may be
faced with the possibility of losing his life.' 8 What is more critical than
that?
125. 39 DECS. COMP. 133, 138-39 (1959).
126. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is applicable only to the
states. The constitution does not by its terms require the federal government to observe a
general rule of equal protection. But the Supreme Court has stated that the due process
clause of the fifth amendment "tends to secure equality of law in the sense that it make a
required minimum of protection for everyone's right of life, liberty, and property, which the
Congress or the Legislature may not withhold." Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 3-12, 331 (1921).
Thus if the equal protection approach was used to guarantee to indigents an absolute
right to counsel at collateral attack proceedings, fifth amendment due process would be the
provision used to carry the guarantee to federal proceedings. See generally Antieau, Equal
Protection Outside The Clause, 40 CAIm. L. Rav. 362-64 (1952).
127. Note 119 supra.
128. Of course it can be argued that at arraignment he has not yet had his day in court,
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The fact that collateral attack proceedings have been categorized as
civil in nature does not constitute a bar to this line of reasoning. For the
Supreme Court has never held them to be civil in nature for right to
counsel purposes. Thus, collateral attack proceedings, though civil in
nature for some purposes, could be held as criminal in nature to extend
to them the absolute right to counsel guarantee of the sixth amendment
and fourteenth amendment due process clause.
The other constitutional avenue open for use in this area is the
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause. 29 It was used in Douglas
v. California8 ° to guarantee an absolute right to counsel at first and only
appeals as of right, and it was used in Smith v. Bennett' 81 to declare
invalid a collateral attack filing fee that precluded indigents from using
the collateral attack procedure solely because of their poverty. If we
combine Douglas and Smith we can make equal protection applicable to
right to counsel problems at collateral attack proceedings as well.
Indeed, equal protection can be used to answer the contention that
an absolute right to counsel should not be granted because the indigent
has had his day in court. Because the fact remains that the indigent has
an absolute right to assert his collateral attack petition, and the only
reason why he does not have counsel to aid him is because of his poverty.
This is the very type of situation that has been labeled as discriminatory
because of poverty, and therefore, invidiously discriminatory and viola-
tive of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause.'82
It seems that Justice Douglas' rationale in Douglas v. California,
though dealing with right to counsel on appeal is applicable also to col-
lateral attack proceedings:
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth
Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys
the benefit of counsel's examination into the record, research of
the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the
indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determination that
his case is without merit, is forced to shift for himself. The indi-
gent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has
only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a
meaningful appeal. 8'
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whereas he has had it when he asserts a collateral attack petition. The writer has attempted
to answer this contention in the text accompanying note 132 infra.
129. See note 126 supra.
130. Supra note 121.
131. 365 U.S. 708 (1960).
132. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Cf. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477
(1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1960); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
133. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
